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CHAPTER 3
Our Common Breath: ‘Conspiration’
from the Stoics to the Church Fathers
Phillip Sidney Horky
This essay tracks the metaphorical expansion of the concept of cosmic
breathing by locating it in ancient Greco-Roman discourses on cosmology
and religion.1 Its chronological scope runs from the mid-third century
BCE, with the philosophy of the great Stoic Chrysippus, and advances as
far as the third century CE, with the Church Father Clement of Alexan-
dria. Over these six centuries, which witnessed extensive transformations
of the philosophical and religious worlds of the Mediterranean and Near
East, we see an expansion of the concept of breathing through the intro-
duction of a notion of ‘conspiration’ (the Ancient Greek abstract noun is
sumpnoia [συμπνoία], and its correlative verb is sumpnein [συμπνε‹ν]).
‘Conspiration’ is my own Anglicization of a concept that refers to the
reciprocal breathing that obtains between animate entities, and functions
to explain how it is that divine and mortal come together in the cosmos.
The concept of ‘conspiration’ (sumpnoia) is sometimes thought to arise
for the first time in the fifth to fourth centuries BCE, being ascribed to
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the early Pythagorean Ecphantus of Syracuse and the legendary physi-
cian Hippocrates of Chios. I will present an alternative account in which
this concept of ‘conspiration’ actually arises in the third century BCE,
in the writings of the Stoics, and in particular Chrysippus of Soli (279–
206 BCE). In order to do so, I will examine a range of evidence from
Greek and Latin didactic, philosophical, and theological texts that helps
both to contextualize the concept of ‘conspiration’ in time and place and
understand its peculiar aspects.
The Latin version of this notion, conspiratio, which is formed of
the verb ‘to breathe’ (spirare) with the prefix ‘with/together’ (con-), is
first attested in the middle of the first century BCE, in the writings of
Cicero, and it had two standard meanings among the Romans. The first
meaning is well-known, that is, the notion of ‘conspiracy’, or an agree-
ment between individuals for the purposes of hostile or illegal activity;2
this is a notion that I will not discuss here, since, while it does represent
a true cognate in Latin, it would appear to be a derivation that does not
represent the original meaning of the term conspiratio; moreover, at least
for our purposes, it is notable that this meaning does not get translated
back into Greek συμπνoία.
The second standard meaning of conspiratio, which appears to be the
older and more original one, is also more valuable to our collaborations
in this volume: it refers to a kind of agreement in voice—a reciprocal
breathing, a concord, a harmony of sorts.3 This sort of conspiratio or
συμπνoία as ‘concord’ is used in domestic environments to refer to
the agreement that, for example, might obtain between a husband and
wife: this appears to be a non-marked usage among philosophical schools
from the first century BCE onward.4 It also appears in the context of
civic communities uniting under terms of agreement, such as a league or
treaty.5 Interestingly, however, ‘conspiration’ as ‘reciprocal breathing’ is
also used metaphorically to describe how the many parts of the harmo-
nious universe—especially the stars and the planets—relate to the cosmic
universe as a whole. Two roughly contemporaneous examples—one in
Latin, and one in Greek—demonstrate this sort of expression:
T1: This fabric which forms the body of the boundless universe, together
with its members composed of nature’s diverse elements, air and fire,
earth and level sea, is ruled by the divine force of Soul; by sacred
dispensation the god draws things together [conspirat ] and governs
with hidden reasoning, and he apportions mutual bonds among
all parts, so that each may furnish and receive another’s strength
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and that the whole may stand fast in kinship despite its variety
of forms.—Manilius, Astronomica 1.247–54 (trans. by G. P. Goold,
modified) (early first century CE).6
T2: It seems to me that the fact that the nature of every animal is
adapted (harmoktai) to the cosmos, and to the things in it, is evidenced
through many indications. For [each animal’s nature], by conspiring
(sumpneiousa) with it [sc. the cosmos] and by being bound to a
path that is simultaneously best and necessary, follows the stream
(rhumai) of the universe that encompasses it, in relation to both the
universal good-order (eukosmia) and the peculiar permanence of each
[thing?]. Hence, this very thing is called a cosmos, and it is the most
perfect of animals that exist. In its parts, which are many and diverse
in nature, this animate [sc. cosmos] rules according to its innate prop-
erties, and because it has a greater share of what is divine. And, in
the nature of the divine continually running (aei theontos theiou),7 the
things that follow the first and greatest path follow it…[lacuna]…and
the wandering planets. —pseudo-Ecphantus of Syracuse, On Kingship,
79.9–14 (mid-first century BCE-mid-first century CE?).8
It is important to contextualize these wonderful passages. Manilius’ Astro-
nomica, which we can date around 15 CE, was written as a cosmic
celebration of two Caesars—Augustus Caesar and Tiberius Caesar, the
first emperors of Rome. As a whole, the poem is often considered repre-
sentative of the didactic genre, borrowing much from other didactic
poems of the Greek and Roman traditions, including Hesiod’s Works
and Days, Aratus’ Phaenomena, Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things, and
Virgil’s Georgics. It is the earliest surviving explicitly astrological work,
and it enjoyed some popularity both in antiquity and in the early twen-
tieth century, having been a particular favourite of A. E. Housman, who
devoted thirty years of his life to working on the text.
At punctuated moments, Manilius refers to the organization of the
universe—and indeed the organization of the poem itself—as subject to
types of primal breathing; this takes the form of, respectively, conspiration
and inspiration. To take the latter, a programmatic passage in Book 2
refers to the ‘divine exhalation’ (divino flatu) that literally inspires his
poem to reach the stars themselves (ad sidera).9 This is of course a
twist on the familiar epic/didactic trope of the poet being inspired by
the divine in order to produce a poem that is sufficiently lofty for the
genre; but that is not all. As scholars have noted, the poem is infused—
no pun intended—with demonstrably Stoic concepts and themes.10 The
Stoics had developed a sophisticated materialist cosmological system in
58 PHILLIP SIDNEY HORKY
which breath functioned as the primary mechanism for the articulation
and sustenance of the parts of the universe. Many passages could be
cited and discussed, but Diogenes Laertius presents one of the clearest
examples:
T3: The cosmos, they [sc. the Stoics] say, is one and this is limited, having
a spherical shape; for a shape of this sort is most suitable for motion,
according to Posidonius in the fifth book of his Natural Reason and the
followers of Antipater in their works On the Cosmos. Outside this [sc. the
cosmos] is diffused the unlimited void, which is incorporeal. By ‘incor-
poreal’ they mean that which, although it is capable of being occupied
by corporeal things, is not occupied by them. There is no void in the
cosmos, but it is wholly unified. For this [sc. unification] necessarily
results from conspiration (sumpnoia) and tension (suntonia) of the
heavenly things towards the terrestrial things.—Diogenes Laertius,
Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 7.140 (text: early third century CE,
looking backwards to the third century BCE).11
The entire description is remarkable,12 but for the purposes of this essay
I want to focus on the last sentence. We can identify here three attributes
of the Stoic cosmos: first, the unity of the cosmos, which results from
conspiration, is somehow ‘necessary’; second, that this conspiration is
related to the notion of the ‘tension’ that obtains between heavenly and
terrestrial objects; and third, that the tension and conspiration proceed
from heavenly objects down to earthly ones (i.e. are downwardly directed
from higher to lower objects ontologically). Given the notion of ‘inspira-
tion’ by the divine breath we noted previously in Manilius—and which is
well attested throughout the poetic tradition from Homer onwards—the
downward motion of conspiration and tension is not especially surprising.
But we should not take it for granted that Manilius’ view that cosmic
conspiration is caused by God, or maintained by God, reflects a canonical
Stoic view.13
Let us now turn from the Stoic notion of cosmic conspiration and
focus on how the Post-Hellenistic Pythagoreans developed these ideas.
To do this, we can return to the description of cosmogony according
to pseudo-Ecphantus of Syracuse in On Kingship. The text of pseudo-
Ecphantus belongs to a series of Pythagorean pseudepigrapha—texts that
were ascribed to the ancient Pythagoreans (who lived at the beginning
of the fifth century BCE but probably wrote little if anything), but that
were composed starting from, at the earliest, around 350 years later, in the
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mid/late second century BCE.14 This particular text appears to have been
composed around the turn of the millennium, although we cannot be sure
exactly when.15 Pseudo-Ecphantus hints at the notion of cosmic harmony
in the first line, where the Greek term harmoktai, which means ‘adjusted
to’ or ‘fitted to’, refers to the Pythagorean concept of the ‘harmony
(harmonia) of the spheres’—well attested both in early Pythagorean
philosophy, and in the pseudepigraphical works of this period. Pseudo-
Ecphantus aims to demonstrate, by appeal to evidence (the ‘indications’),
that each ‘animal’ is properly fitted to, or harmonized with, the cosmos
as a whole. These ‘animals’ could include not only mundane objects, like
human beings or dogs, but also, and more importantly, stars and planets,
which, by virtue of being capable of moving themselves, were considered
animate by the Pythagoreans of this period.16 But they are all subject
to the greatest and most perfect animal of all—the cosmos, which rules
over everything inside it. Of special importance to our subject is the idea
that each animate being that is ruled over by the cosmos ‘conspires’ with
it, and this act of conspiration is emblematic of each animal’s engage-
ment with the ‘stream’ or flux of the universe. In another fragment of
this work, we find that all humans have a divinely portioned inspiration
(empnoiesis), and, at least among terrestrial creatures, they appear to share
to the greatest extent in the divine breath.17
That the ascription of a theory of cosmic conspiration is being associ-
ated with a great Pythagorean cosmologist is itself unsurprising, since the
Pythagoreans were among the very first Greek philosophers to concep-
tualize the articulation of the cosmos as an act of breathing.18 However,
what differentiates pseudo-Ecphantus’ On Kingship from what we can
trace back to early Pythagoreanism 350 years prior, is that here each
ensouled animal itself breathes in unison, or ‘co-breathes’, along with
the cosmos, whereas among the early Pythagoreans it was the cosmos
as a whole that did the breathing and not its parts (at least so far as the
surviving evidence suggests).19 That is to say, for pseudo-Ecphantus, in
the act of conspiring with the universe, each animal plays its own part in
the cosmic system and carves its own path in accordance with its peculiar
capacities. Such an act of ‘conspiration’ might seem to indicate agency
on the part of the lower animate beings. But how much agency do these
Post-Hellenistic Pythagoreans really accord to lower animate beings vis-à-
vis conspiration? Other roughly contemporary evidence shows that some
figures, like Moderatus of Gades (a self-proclaimed Pythagorean20 who
probably lived at the end of the first century CE), understood the one21
to be the ultimate cause of such a cosmic conspiration from, just as we
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saw for the Stoics, the top down. Moderatus believed that the number
one is the ‘cause of the conspiration and the sympathy of wholes’:
T4: Geometricians too, since they do not have the ability to express incor-
poreal things in speech, have recourse to figural diagrams when they say
‘this is a triangle’: they do not mean that what falls to the eye is the
triangle, but that it [sc. the triangle] is of this sort, and it is through
this that they express the concept of the triangle. And the Pythagoreans
did the same thing in the case of primary reasons and types: since they
did not have the ability to express the incorporeal types and first prin-
ciples in speech, they had recourse to numerical demonstration. And in
this way they called the one the reason of unity, and of identity and
equality; and they called it the cause of the conspiration (sumpnoia)
and the sympathy (sumpatheia) of wholes, and of the preservation
of what is absolute and as such: for, indeed, when it is among things
[divided] part by part, the one subsists by unifying with the parts, and
by conspiring (sumpnoun) with them according to participation in
the primary cause.22—Porphyry of Tyre, citing Moderatus of Gades,
Life of Pythagoras 49 (text: late third century CE, looking back at end
of first century CE).23
Here we see a remarkable account of how cosmic conspiration works.
Moderatus explains that the early Pythagoreans needed to be able to
explain how incorporeal things, such as the ultimate causes of everything
in the universe or the ultimate species of existence, could be formulated
in speech, when they could not be seen by the eye. They appealed to
numbers , which belong to both the world of the concept and the world
of sense-perception: for example, we can see the twoness of two pints
of beer with our eyes, but at the same time we can think ‘twoness’ in
our heads without having to associate it with the two pints of beer we
are seeing. For these Pythagoreans, numbers were substantial rather than
(as Aristotle might hold) quantitative predicates, which indicated some-
thing fundamental about the identity of the object under examination.
The number one, which is solicited here, for example, is understood to
be the explanation for unity, equality, and identity of enumerated objects.
It is equally understood to be the cause of ‘conspiration and sympathy’
among those objects, that which allows them to participate in the ulti-
mate cause of all, namely, the One (not the number one, but the One
that is above all Being and Existence).24 As with the Stoics, conspira-
tion is understood to be a top-down mechanism that explains the unity
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of the diversity of the cosmos; higher beings—whether we call them
‘God’, or ‘the divine’, or ‘the number one’, or ‘the One’—are respon-
sible for sustaining the act of cosmic breathing, and lower animate beings
simply reciprocate the action by necessity. Among the Stoics and the
Hellenistic/Post-Hellenistic Pythagoreans, then, conspiration is similarly
asymmetrical and top down.
In the final part of this essay, I want to turn to the origins of the
notion of cosmic conspiration. If the concept was not really developed by
the Early Pythagoreans, where, and when, we might ask, did it ultimately
arise? The ostensible answer reveals as many questions about the problem
as it does solutions. It comes in the writings of the famous physician Galen
(ca. 130 CE–ca. 210 CE):
T5: If, on the other hand, we were to bring forward philosophers from
the Stoa to the council chamber and entrust the vote to them, on the
basis of the doctrines they themselves have put forward, they will crown
Hippocrates. For Hippocrates was the first to propose [the elemental
qualities of] hot, cold, dry and moist and, after him, Aristotle proved
them.
And the followers of Chrysippus, when they accepted these things
already to hand, were not embroiled in contention. Rather, they say
that all things are compounded from these [four elemental qualities],
and that these things are affected by and act on each other, and
that nature is proficient. And they approve all the other doctrines of
Hippocrates regarding nature, apart from one minor point which is a
difference between them and Aristotle. For when Hippocrates correctly
says that ‘the whole body conspires (sumpnoun) and flows together
(surroun)’, and that ‘all the members of animate things are [in]
sympathy (sumpathea)’, both accept this very point. However, they
differ in this: Aristotle held that the qualities alone interpenetrate each
other and are mixed together completely, whereas those from the Stoa
suppose that not these qualities only but also the substances themselves
[are mixed completely].—Galen, Method of Medicine 1.2,25 attacking
Thessalus and defending Hippocrates (trans. by Ian Johnston and G.
H. R. Horsley, modified) (text: mid-second century CE).
Thankfully, we actually have the passage Galen is summarizing, from the
treatise On Nutriment, ascribed to Hippocrates of Chios (ca. 460–ca.
375 BCE), who was a rough contemporary of the early Pythagoreans:
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T6: XXIII. Conflux (surroia) one, conspiration (sumpnoia) one, [in]
sympathy (sumpathea) all things; in wholeness of limbs, all things,
but severally, the parts in each part relative to the function.
XXIV. The great beginning comes to the furthest part; from the
furthest part it travels to the great beginning: one nature, to be and
not to be. —Pseudo-Hippocrates, On Nutriment 23–24, p. 143.1 Joly,
9.106,6 (before mid-second century CE).26
Now when we examine these texts, we face a similar problem to that faced
with the text of pseudo-Ecphantus. It is not certain that On Nutriment
reflects Hippocrates’ own words: rather we are dealing here with a textual
tradition in which Hippocratic texts were produced over a long period
of time. Scholars have attempted to date this text to a period as early
as the beginning of the fourth century BCE;27 at any rate, we need to
date it prior to Galen, who knew it in the mid-second century CE. Does
the style help us to adjudicate the matter? Someone might describe it as
archaic, or as archaizing: as Craik notes, the style is aphoristic,28 and we
might think it could reflect anything from Heraclitean riddle to a Hippo-
cratic physician’s crib notes. But here Galen is instructive: he places the
document within a ‘first discoverers’ topos, using (his own interpretation
of) the Hippocratic text to demonstrate that Hippocrates was the first
to advance a theory of the elemental qualities. He is at pains to demon-
strate that Hippocrates anticipated the elemental theories of the Stoics
(especially Chrysippus) and Aristotle, and that they agreed with him in
most ways. This is a worrying sign, because it is not obvious that Aris-
totle agreed with Hippocrates at all on this point; and while the Stoics
would appear to have agreed with him (as well as the Post-Hellenistic
Pythagorean pseudo-Ecphantus, and the Neo-Pythagorean Moderatus),
this would point to a Stoic origin for the aphoristic statement ‘Conflux
one, conspiration one, [in] sympathy all things’; after all, the evidence
for Stoic conspiration as sympathy is robust, whereas this is the only
evidence for a similar idea among Hippocratics. It seems likely, then, that
the Hippocratic On Nutriment is a text influenced by Stoicism, rather
than the other way around, and moreover that similarities in the formula-
tion found among the Post-Hellenistic Pythagoreans also point to a Stoic
origin.
What are we left with at the end of this selective discussion of notions
of cosmic conspiration? After examining texts written by a Roman didactic
poet (Manilius), some Post-Hellenistic Pythagoreans (pseudo-Ecphantus
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and Moderatus), a materialist philosophical school (the Stoics), a famous
doctor (Galen), and an unknown author of an enigmatic medical text
(the Hippocratic author of On Nutriment ), we can conclude that cosmic
conspiration as described here is ultimately the brainchild of the Stoics,
and probably the transformative Chrysippus of Soli, whose contribu-
tions to philosophy are so wide and varied it becomes almost impossible
to determine them. In this way he resembles the legendary Pythagoras
and Hippocrates—with the exception that it is less common to see
ancient philosophers and doxographers crediting Chrysippus with major
contributions to the history of thought.
By way of a coda, to give some indication of where things go from
Galen, it is worth considering a text written by Clement (ca. 150 CE–
ca. 215 CE), a Christian theologian and convert who lived and taught in
Alexandria, a centre for philosophical activity and culture since the time
of Aristotle. As teacher of the immensely influential Origen of Alexandria,
Clement is to be counted as especially important in the transformation
of Greek philosophy to Christian doctrine. In the following passage of
his Miscellanies Clement both appropriates and rejects the philosophical
and medical models of ‘conspiration’, in favour of something apparently
different:
T7: What, then, is their [sc. the worshippers’] idea as to the breathing of
God? Is it by means of transpiration as in the demons? Or by inspiration
only, as in fishes through the dilation of their gills? Or by circumspira-
tion, as in insects through the pressure of the membranes on the waist?
No, they would not liken God to any of these, if they were in their
senses. But as for creatures that live by respiration, they draw in the air
by rhythmic beats corresponding to the counter-dilatation of the lungs
against the chest. Then if they assign viscera and arteries and veins and
sinews and members to God, they will exhibit Him as in no respect
differing from man.
The word ‘conspiration’ (sumpnoia) is that which is properly used
of the Church. For the Church’s sacrifice is indeed speech rising, like
incense, from holy souls, while every thought of the heart is laid open
to God along with the sacrifice. They are fond of talking about the
purity of the most ancient altar at Delos, that altar which, we are told,
was the only one approached by Pythagoras, because it was unpolluted
by slaughter and death: will they then refuse credence to us when we
say that the truly hallowed altar is the righteous soul, and the incense
which ascends from it, the prayer of holiness? Sacrifices, I believe, are an
invention of mankind to excuse the eating of flesh, though, even apart
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from such idolatry, it was always possible for one who wished it to
partake of flesh.—Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies VII 6.32 (trans.
by Hort and Mayor) (late second century CE).29
It may be that Clement found in his doxographical sources the rather
typical claim that ascribed a high value to the notion of breath and
breathing to Pythagoras; and, indeed, this association is as old as Aristotle
in the mid-fourth century BCE.30 Clement’s rejection of anthropomor-
phizing God rests on the implication that He cannot ‘breathe’ in any way
similar to the animals He created; and it is a point well taken, if not very
original.31 However, this rejection also places certain special demands
on Christian readers of, for example, Genesis 2:7, where famously God
breathes into the nostrils of Adam in order to give him life: how are we to
explain this obvious analogy drawn between God and Man, both of whom
breathe?32 Clement’s solution to the problem, to find in the Church the
proper space for deployment of the powerful metaphor of conspiration,
is inflected with Pythagorean and Stoic ideas that trace back, at the very
latest (and possibly earlier), to the first century BCE, whereby conspira-
tion is a collaborative effort that somehow connects mere mortals to the
highest reaches of the cosmos—even to God. In this way, Clement offers
a resonant example of how the Christian writers of the second and third
centuries CE sought to reject pagan philosophical doctrines as absurd
and contrary to Christian wisdom, while still carefully manipulating and
repurposing their content in almost imperceptible ways.
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is the cosmos that engages in conspiration, and not god (as in Philo, who
is influenced by Genesis).
18. See Horky, ‘Cosmic Spiritualism’, 272–75.
19. Ibid.
20. He is often referred to as a ‘Neo-Pythagorean’ (cf. John Dillon, The
Middle Platonists: 80 B.C. to A.D. 220, rev. edn (London: Duckworth,
1996), 341).
21. Typically, we would be inclined to capitalize as ‘the One’; but it is clear,
as we see in the passage, that Moderatus does not mean to refer to the
divine One, or the god One, to which the Middle Platonists deferred.
22. That this passage ultimately derives from Moderatus is clear from
Porphyry, Life of Pythagoras 48, where Porphyry tells us that Moderatus
treated Pythagorean numerology and compared their approach to that of
the geometricians.
23. Porphyre, Vie de Pythagore, Lettre à Marcella, ed. by Edouard des Places
(Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982).
24. On the three Ones in Moderatus’ ontology, see Dillon, Middle Platon-
ists, 347, and the cautionary remarks of Svetla Slaveva-Griffin, Plotinus on
Number (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 44–46.
25. Galen, Method of Medicine, vol. 1, bks 1–4, ed. and trans. by I. Johnston
and G. H. R. Horsley (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011),
1.27–28. Cf. von Arnim, ed., Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 2.411.
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26. Hippocrate, Du régime des maladies aiguës, De l’aliment, De l’usage des
liquides, vol. 6.2, ed. by R. Joly (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1972), 9.106,6.
27. E.g., Elizabeth M. Craik, The ‘Hippocratic’ Corpus: Content and Context
(London: Routledge, 2015), 26 (who follows Joly).
28. Ibid.
29. Fenton John Anthony Hort, and Joseph B. Mayor, Clement of Alexan-
dria: Miscellanies Book VII (London: Macmillan, 1902), 5.5.
30. See Horky, ‘Cosmic Spiritualism’, 272–75.
31. The rejection of anthropomorphic gods is as old as Xenophanes of
Colophon in the late-sixth-century BCE (see Hermann Diels and Walther
Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th edn, vol. 2 (Berlin: Weid-
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